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Greenwald Neurosurgical Does Not Analyze the District Court's Decision 
Under the Correct Standard of Review. 
Greenwald Neurosurgical appears to analyze the district court's grant of summary 
judgment as if it sat as the trier of fact, an analysis perhaps dictated by the district court's 
summary judgment decision, which misapplied the summary judgment standard. 
Hence, Greenwald Neurosurgical dismisses the numerous contradictory statements and 
evidence in the record by arguing that "[t]hese statements clearly provide the factual basis" for 
the district court's conclusions, (Respondent's Brief, p. 17), and concludes its brief by stating 
that "[t]he summary judgment granted by the District Court was proper, based on substantial 
facts, and after giving all reasonable inferences to the Defendant." (Id., p. 20.) 
Rule 56(c) does not provide that summary judgment is appropriate when there are 
"substantial facts" supporting the trial court's decision. That is not the summary judgment 
standard at the district court level, or on appeal. 
This Court's review of a district court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment is the 
same as that required of the trial court when ruling on the motion. City of Sandpoint v. 
Sandpoint Independent Highway District, 139 Idaho 65, 72 P.3d 905, 907 (2003). On appeal, 
this Court exercises free review in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists 
and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Edwards v. 
Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851,852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct.App.1986). On a motion for 
summary judgment, the trial court must determine whether the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions, together with affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c); 56(c); Bonz 
v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539,541,808 P.2d 876, 878 (1991). 
Though it was presented with a summary judgment motion, the district court appeared to 
misapprehend the appropriate standard in stating "the focus is whether the record supports a 
claim that the P.C. [Greenwald Neurosurgical] suffered damages." (R., p. 704.) It is apparent 
from this statement - and the decision itself - that the district court essentially decided 
Greenwald's Neurosurgical's motion as the trier of fact. 
While it is true that district courts, where they sit as the trier of fact, weigh conflicting 
evidence and testimony and judge the credibility of witnesses, see, e.g., Sun Valley Shamrock 
Resources, Inc. v. Travelers Leasing Corp., 118 Idaho 116, 118, 794 P.2d 1389, 1391 (1990), 
they are not permitted to do so on summary judgment. Rather, it is the moving party's obligation 
to show the "absence" of a genuine issue of material fact, see Smith v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. 
No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 719, 918 P.2d 583, 588 (1996), which the district court in the instant 
matter impliedly recognized was not the case by noting that its "focus" was simply to determine 
whether the "record" supported Greenwald Neurosurgical's claim that it "suffered damages." 
(R, p. 704.) 
Furthermore, the district court essentially admitted that there were genuine issues of fact 
in the record by concluding that "Western is correct that the new affidavits 1 attempt to 
recharacterize the alleged loss as well as the particular entity suffering the loss," (R., p. 704), 
1 This reference is to the Ditmore and Clayton affidavits of April, 2017. (R. , pp. 309 and 317.) 
2 
and that "it is the source of the lost funds that has gone through a metamorphosis." (Id.) 
(Emphasis added.) 
The above language demonstrates the district court's recognition that there were facts in 
the record that had changed over time. 
Rule 56(c) did not give the district court the authority to interpret and analyze the change 
in facts and decide which to believe. Accordingly, it erred in granting summary judgment. 
B. The District Court and Greenwald Neurosurgical Erroneously Claim that Western 
Surety Submitted No Responsive Affidavits or Evidence on Summary Judgment 
and Ignored that there were Genuine Issues of Disputed Material Fact in Movant's 
Submissions. 
Greenwald Neurosurgical incorrectly claims that Western Surety failed "to supply any 
responsive affidavits or evidence to create an issue of fact." (Response Brief, p. 10.)2 This 
argument seems intended to defend the district court's conclusion that Western Surety did not 
produce any evidence to contradict the accountant, Troy Clayton's statement, that Greenwald 
Neurosurgical was the "source of all money received by Mr. Matt Udy." (R., p. 706.) While the 
district court recognized that Western Surety relied on "previous disclosures" to "contradict the 
P.C.'s new affidavits," the court was "not convinced there [was] a contradiction." (R., p. 705.) 
The court reasoned that the new affidavits, rather than "contradicting prior disclosures," simply 
2 The canard that Western Surety failed to submit evidence on summary judgment features 
prominently in Greenwald Neurosurgical's brief. E.g., "affidavits were never countered by 
affidavits or evidence from the Defendant," (Respondent's Brief, p. 17), the evidence on 
summary judgment was "uncontroverted," (id .. ), and "Defendant provided no affidavits nor 
evidence for rebuttal at summary judgment." (Id., p. 21.) These statements are false and ignore 
that Greenwald Neurosurgical's own submissions contained disputed material facts. 
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"explained" that Udy had replenished looted accounts out of Greenwald Neurosurgical's "looted 
accounts." (Id.) 
Putting aside that Western Surety submitted many pages of evidence into the record on 
summary judgment, (R., pp. 344-410), which the district court seemed to recognize in conceding 
that Western Surety was correct that the facts in the case had been "recharacterized" and gone 
through a "metamorphosis," (R., p. 704), Greenwald Neurosurgical's submissions never shifted 
the burden of producing evidence to Western Surety. This is because its submissions contained 
the disputed issues of genuine material fact that precluded summary judgment. 
"Where the evidentiary matter in support of the motion does not establish the absence of 
a genuine issue, summary judgment must be denied even if no opposing evidentiary matter is 
presented." McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765,771,820 P.2d 360,366 (1991). In that 
circumstance, "opposing evidentiary matter" is not required, as the moving submissions contain 
disputed issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. Id. 
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Western Surety did not submit affidavits or 
evidence in opposition to the summary judgment, summary judgment was inappropriate because 
Greenwald Neurosurgical's submissions established that there were genuine issues of disputed 
material fact. 
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C. Greenwald Neurosurgical Ignores the Numerous Genuine Issues of Disputed 
Material Fact that Preclude Summary Judgment, Many of Which Involve 
Credibility Issues. 
Greenwald Neurosurgical's brief contains virtually no discussion of the genuine issues of 
material fact throughout the record, many of which are the product of contradictions between its 
representations to Western Surety during the pre-litigation claim process, its discovery 
responses, and the affidavits of Janene Ditmore and Troy Clayton that were submitted on 
summary judgment in April, 2017. 
The district court's conclusion that there was no "contradiction" between the affidavits 
and other evidence is itself a recognition that there were inconsistencies that required analysis by 
a trier of fact (which the district court was not). The district court did not have the authority, on 
summary judgment, to decide that the conflicting facts before it were not contradictory. 
"A determination of credibility should not be made on summary judgment if credibility 
can be tested in court before the trier of fact." Lowry v. Ireland Bank, 116 Idaho 708, 711, 779 
P.2d 22, 25 (Ct.App. 1989); Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 Idaho 668,691 P.2d 1283 (Ct.App. 1984). 
This rule is reflected in IDJI 2d 1.00, which gives the jury (and the jury alone) the power 
to decide credibility issues: 
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the course 
of the trial. As the sole judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence 
you believe and what weight you attach to it. In so doing, you bring with you to 
this courtroom all of the experience and background of your lives. There is no 
magical formulate for evaluating testimony. In your everyday affairs, you 
determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe and how much 
weight you attach to what you are told. The considerations you use in making the 
more important decisions in your everyday dealings are the same considerations 
you should apply in your deliberations in this case. 
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With these basic rules in mind, the record before the district court was filled with 
inconsistencies, contradictions, impossibilities, and witness credibility issues that only a jury 
could resolve. 
On appeal, the issue is simply whether there was evidence in the record from which a 
jury could conclude in Western Surety's favor. Lowry, 116 Idaho at 711, 779 P.2d at 25. On this 
record there clearly was evidence from which a jury could conclude that Udy did not take money 
from Greenwald Neurosurgical. 
1. As the District Court Recognized, Greenwald Neurosurgical's Story 
Changed After the District Court Ruled that the Bond Only Covered 
Greenwald Neurosurgical's Losses. 
As the district court recognized, none of Greenwald Neurosurgical's claim submissions 
before litigation3 showed what its losses were, if any. "However, there is nothing in the 214 
pages [in the claims file submitted on summary judgment] that clearly identifies any transfers 
wrongfully made from the P.C. account to either Allagash, Dr. Greenwald's credit card accounts, 
or some other destination." (R., pp. 704-705.) 
The court concluded that it was only the April, 2017 Ditmore and Clayton affidavits that 
shifted the burden to Western Surety to show that money was not "transferred from the P.C. 
account as purported," (R., p. 705), while at the same time acknowledging that Greenwald 
Neurosurgical had "re-characterize[d] the alleged loss as well as the particular entity suffering 
3 In support of its reply brief on summary, Greenwald Neurosurgical submitted an affidavit from 
its counsel, Larren Covert, which attached the entirety of Western Surety's underwriting and 
claims files. The latter contained all claims materials submitted to Western Surety by Greenwald 
Neurosurgical. (R., pp. 424-676.) The claim file is denoted by the word "CLAIM" before the 
bates number. 
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the loss" and that the "source" of the "lost funds" had undergone a "metamorphosis." (R., p. 
704.) 
Remarkably, the district court commented in its decision that "[t]here is no reason why 
losses once accurately attributed to Allagash and/or Dr. Greenwald personally cannot also be 
traced to losses originally sustained by the P.C." (R., p. 705 (emphasis added).) While a jury 
could perhaps reach this conclusion, there is an alternate explanation for the change in stories 
that is less charitable for Greenwald Neurosurgical.4 
The alternative explanation, which the district court's decision prevent Western Surety 
from making to a jury, is that Matthew Udy either took no money from Greenwald 
Neurosurgical, or took far less than the $100,000.00 bond limit. 
Greenwald Neurosurgical provided no evidence tha.t Udy took money from it in the claim 
process, ignored repeated requests by Western Surety to provide that evidence before litigation, 
and took the position that it didn't have to provide that evidence because the bond covered Dr. 
Greenwald personally,5 Allagash Realty, Greenwald Neurosurgical, and any business that 
operated out of Greenwald Neurosurgical' s address. 
In opposing Western Surety's summary judgment - which argued that the bond only 
covered Greenwald Neurosurgical, and that there was no evidence Udy took money from 
4 Furthermore, the court's statement is troubling because it seems to settle that the claim, as 
presented to Western Surety before litigation, was not covered, i.e., Western Surety appropriately 
denied the claim pre-litigation (because there was no apportionment of loss to Greenwald 
Neurosurgical) but got sued anyway. 
5 Greenwald Neurosurgical argues in its cross-appeal that Dr. Greenwald was covered for his 
personal losses under the bond. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 21-23.) 
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Greenwald Neurosurgical - the only evidence presented by Greenwald Neurosurgical that it had 
losses was its counsel's statement at the hearing on Western Surety's summary judgment that 
"We have provided documentation showing 28,534 from Greenwald Neurosurgical. The rest of 
it was from Allagash and credit card fraud." (Tr., 01/11/2017 Hearing, 21 :23-22:2 (emphasis 
added).) 
It was only after the district court, on January 13, 2017, (R., p. 283), ruled that the bond 
only covered losses to Greenwald Neurosurgical, that Greenwald Neurosurgical presented an 
entirely new version of the facts via the Ditmore and Clayton affidavits in April, 2017. 
Why were the "facts" presented by the April, 2017 Ditmore and Clayton affidavits never 
presented to the Idaho Falls Police during its 2013 investigation, or to Western Surety during the 
claim process? Why, when Western Surety asked for documentation of losses to Greenwald 
Neurosurgical on January 19, 2014, (R., p. 482), March 21, 2014, (R., p. 480), June 3, 2014, (R., 
p. 467), August 28, 2014, (R., p. 466), and January 5, 2015, (R., p. 463), did Greenwald 
Neurosurgical give it nothing? 
And why, when it finally responded to Western Surety's request for apportionment on 
April 17, 2015, did Greenwald Neurosurgical argue that the loss was covered simply because 
Udy was employed by one of Dr. Greenwald's entities (Greenwald Neurosurgical) and "gained 
access to the credit cards and Allagash funds exclusively through his employment for Dr. 
Greenwald, in his neurosurgical center?" (R., p. 227.) 
Based on the foregoing, a jury could absolutely conclude that the reason Greenwald 
Neurosurgical never identified loss to it during the claim process was because it either had no 
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losses or because its losses were at or below the number ($28,553.00) represented by its counsel 
in open court on January 1, 2017. 
2. There Is Evidence that Greenwald Neurosurgical Falsely Claims that Udy 
Took $140,095.00 From It Rather than from Allagash Realty. 
Greenwald Neurosurgical chooses to ignore that its accountant, Troy Clayton, told the 
Idaho Falls Police that Udy took $140,095.00 from Allagash Realty by intercepting rental 
checks, from 2011 into 2013, and depositing them in a fake Allagash Realty account he created 
at his credit union. (Appellant's Brief, p. 20.) 
He never told the Idaho Falls Police that Udy went to Janene Ditmore, Greenwald 
Neurosurgical's office manager, and fraudulently induced her to transfer, to the penny, that same 
amount ($140,095.00) to the phony Allagash account, which he then spent on himself: "As a 
result of the deception, Ms. Ditmore withdrew funds from Greenwald Neurosurgical and 
deposited the funds into the fraudulent Allagash account which was thereafter removed by Mr. 
Udy for his personal use." (R., p. 320, <J[ 13.)6 Clayton said this, for the first time, in April, 2017. 
Putting aside the obvious question of why Clayton withheld this information from the 
Idaho Falls Police during its initial investigation, the check ledger Greenwald Neurosurgical 
presented to Western Surety in support of its claim does not show deposits to Udy's "phony" 
Allagash Realty account from the Greenwald Neurosurgical account. Rather, as the Idaho Falls 
Police concluded, the ledger showed $140,095.00 in "rentals taken" by Udy. (R., p. 491.) 
6 Greenwald Neurosurgical is correct that the cite to R., p. 310, <J[ 13 at p. 15 of Western Surety's 
opening brief is incorrect. The quote - which is accurate - is at p. 320 of the record. 
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If, as Clayton contends, Ditmore transferred $140,095.00 from the Greenwald 
Neurosurgical account, at Ody's request, to Ody's phony Allagash account, that should be 
reflected in a bank statement for Greenwald Neurosurgical account and in the ledger for the 
phony Allagash account presented to Western Surety as part of the claim. 
No such transfers are reflected in the statements. 
Even if they were it would mean that Udy took $140,095.00 in Allagash rents and 
$140,095.00 from Greenwald Neurosurgical , for a combined total of $280,190.00. Greenwald 
Neurosurgical never contended that was the case in its claim, instead stating simply that Udy 
took $140.095.00 "from Allagash," (R., p. 478), a figure confirmed by the Idaho Falls Police 
following its interview of Clayton and its review of the evidence submitted to it by Greenwald 
Neurosurgical. 
While the district court accepted Clayton's conclusory statement that Greenwald 
Neurosurgical was the "source of all money received by Mr. Matt Udy," (R., p. 706), numerous 
facts contradict that conclusion, including Clayton's own words to the Idaho Falls Police and the 
documentary submissions to Western Surety. 
3. There is Evidence That Greenwald Neurosurgical Falsely Claims that Udy 
Transferred $130,091.20 from Its Account to Pay Balances on Dr. 
Greenwald's Personal Credit Cards. 
The April, 2017 affidavits of Ditmore and Clayton essentially rewrote the claim 
submissions for the $130,091.20 charged by Udy on Dr. Greenwald's personal credit cards. 
During the claim process, and before the district court's January 13, 2017 summary 
judgment ruling, the submissions all claimed that Dr. Greenwald, personally, was liable for the 
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charges on the cards taken out by Udy in his name: a. "/ am unable to obtain relief from the 
credit card charges ... " (R., p. 486, <JI 10; R., p. 95, <JI 10); b. money was taken from "my 
checking accounts" to pay for "these credit card charges." (R., p. 95, <J[8; R., p. 486, <JI 9.) 
So, in Dr. Greenwald's own words, the loss was his, not Greenwald Neurosurgical's. 
The summary sheets for each credit card, submitted to Western Surety to support the 
claim, showed only "charges" and not payments. (R., pp. 599, 652, 654, and 566); see also 
Appellant's Brief, p.10. 
To this day neither Greenwald Neurosurgical or anyone else has claimed or argued that 
the statements for the credit cards, which are part of the record, show payments of $130.090.20 
on the cards with funds taken from Greenwald Neurosurgical. This is because they do not, 
contradicting Ditmore's claim that Udy used "Greenwald Neurosurgical business funds to pay 
for his credit card charges." (R., p. 312, <JI 14. e.) She stated, categorically, that "[t]hese funds 
taken were fraudulently removed from the Greenwald Neurosurgical business account to pay for 
the amounts fraudulently charged by Mr. Udy." (Id., <JI 14. f.) Yet, neither the credit card 
statements contained in the claim file (R., pp. 535-665), or the summary of expenditures on the 
cards (R., pp. 599, 652, 654, 566), support this statement. 
Additionally, Ditmore's version of the credit card losses is different than Clayton's, who 
claimed that Udy "would approach Ms. Ditmore and report that he needed money from the 
business account to pay Dr. Greenwald's credit card statements." (Id., p. 319, <JI 11.) He then 
induced Ditmore to transfer an "exaggerated amount," deposited the amount in "Dr. Greenwald's 
personal account," and then "withdrew the excess money for his personal use." (Id.) 
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These versions cannot be squared. Ditmore claimed that Udy used the money he had her 
transfer from the Greenwald Neurosurgical account to pay the combined balances of 
$130,091.20 on the personal credit cards he had fraudulently used. Clayton claimed that Udy 
had her transfer an "excess" amount of money (totaling $130,091.20) from Greenwald 
Neurosurgical under the premise of paying down the balances on the personal credit cards he had 
fraudulently used, but then spent that excess on himself. 
Putting aside that neither of these versions of events were presented to either the Idaho 
Falls Police during its investigation, or to Western Surety during the claims process, both things 
could not have happened. They are inconsistent, and it is up to a jury to decide who or what to 
believe, and to assess the credibility of Ditmore and Clayton. 
Last, there is the problem that there is no apportionment of the $89,000.00 figure 
identified by Ditmore as being the sum Udy fraudulently induced her to transfer from Greenwald 
Neurosurgical to cover the $140,095.00 in Allagash expenses and/or to pay down the 
$130.091.20 in charges on Dr. Greenwald's personal credit cards. Accordingly, if a jury found-
as it could - that Udy simply took checks from Allagash Realty tenants, deposited them in his 
phony Allagash account, and spent them, then none of the purported $89,000.00 was actually 
utilized to defraud Greenwald Neurosurgical via the Allagash misrepresentations. Accordingly, 
that portion of the $89,000.00 transferred out of Greenwald Neurosurgical under the guise of 
covering Allagash debts would not be recoverable. But, we don't know what portion of the 
$89,000.00 that would be. 
D. There Was Evidence Udy Did not Meet the Bond's Definition of an "Employee." 
12 
Greenwald Neurosurgical misses the central point of Western Surety's argument, which 
is that - accepting the Ditmore and Clayton affidavits as true - Udy's purported theft was not 
covered by the bond since he induced Ditmore to transfer funds from Greenwald Neurosurgical 
for the benefit of either Allagash Realty or, with respect to the credit cards, for the benefit of Dr. 
Greenwald. 
The bond only protected against losses caused by an "employee," meaning one in "the 
regular service of the Insured in the ordinary course of the Insured's business during the term of 
this bond, and whom the insured compensates by salary .... " (R., p. 470, <J[ 4.) 
Surety bonds are interpreted as any other contract and "[t]he interpretation and legal 
effect of an unambiguous contract are questions of law to be resolved by the court rather than the 
jury." Luzar v. Western Surety Co., 107 Idaho 693 (1984 ); Thompson v. U.S. Fidelity & 
Guaranty Co., 3 F.Supp. 756 (D. Idaho 1933) (a surety cannot be held liable beyond the terms of 
its bond). 
The bonded entity was a neurosurgical practice, Greenwald Neurosurgical, not Allagash 
Realty or Dr. Greenwald, personally. A neurosurgical practice does not, by definition, include 
personal services for its owner or services for a real estate company owned by an owner of the 
neurosurgical practice. Hence, the purported misrepresentations Udy used to allegedly induce 
Ditmore to transfer funds from Greenwald Neurosurgical - i.e., so he could "cover" money he 
had taken from Allagash Realty and pay down balances charged on Dr. Greenwald's personal 
credit cards - were not made in the "ordinary course" of the "Insured's business." 
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Furthermore, contrary to the district court's analysis, Udy did not have the authority to 
move money out of "the P.C.," Greenwald Neurosurgical.7 The district court's conclusion that 
moving money "out of the P.C." was part of the "regular service" Udy performed for the P.C., 
(R., p. 703), is simply wrong, or - at the very least - disputed. 
Both the Ditmore and Clayton affidavits noted that only Ditmore had authority to transfer 
money,8 and the description of Ditmore's job duties submitted on summary judgment provides 
that her duties included: 
* Administer all banking associated with the medical practice for both 
payables and receivables. 
*Exclusive management of banking of medical practice funds received 
with assistance or periodic oversight by account personnel (Troy Clayton, CPA). 
* Assist, facilitate deposit, transfer, withdrawal of funds in various 
personal and alternate business accounts per Owner's needs. 
(R., p. 315 (emphasis added).) 
Accordingly, Udy's fraud was accomplished wile acting on behalf of two unbonded 
entities, Dr. Greenwald (personally) and Allagash Realty. He did not have the authority to 
7 On appeal we are now told that Udy simply had the authority to "request the movement of 
money for the PC." (R., p. 19.) During the claims process Dr. Greenwald asserted that Udy had 
"complete and unrestricted access to all of my confidential personal and business accounts," and 
that his responsibilities included "payment of accounts payable ... " (R., p. 472, CJ[ 3.) With 
respect to the Greenwald Neurosurgical account, these statements are false, as only Ditmore had 
the authority to transfer those funds. 
8 Clayton stated that funds could not be moved without Ditmore's knowledge, (R., p. 318, CJ[ 9), 
Ditmore noted that all funds withdrawn from Greenwald Neurosurgical were reviewed and 
managed by her, (R., p. 310, CJ[ 6), and that Udy "individually and separately managed the 
personal and Allagash accounts and paid Mr. Greenwald's credit card statements and other 
bills." (R., p. 310, CJ[ 7.) Furthermore, Udy was employed to "manage Mr. Greenwald's 
investment accounts, rental properties and pay his credit card invoices and personal bills as 
received." (Id., p . 310, CJ[ 8.) 
14 
transfer money out of Greenwald Neurosurgical, and had to deceive Ditmore into doing that for 
the sole benefit of two unbonded entities, Dr. Greenwald (personally) and Allagash Realty. 
While there is no dispute that only Greenwald Neurosurgical paid Udy, there seems little 
to no dispute that by definition the operation of a neurosurgical practice does not include 
performing personal tasks for an owner (such as the payment of personal credit cards) or the 
management of a real estate company. Hence, none of the things Udy did to accomplish his 
fraud were done in the "ordinary course" of working for a neurosurgical practice. He did not 
have the authority to transfer funds out of Greenwald Neurosurgical, and had to deceive Ditmore 
- allegedly - into doing that. 
On these facts, Udy is no different than any other third party in a position to take money 
from a third party. His alleged theft was not accomplished in the "ordinary course" of working 
for a neurosurgical practice, and he did not have the authority - as an employee of Greenwald 
Neurosurgical - to transfer funds to third parties. Only Ditmore had that authority. 
Stated differently, on this record the alleged theft from Greenwald Neurosurgical was 
essentially accomplished by someone (Udy) on behalf of third parties who did not compensate 
him for his services. He was not acting on behalf of Greenwald Neurosurgical. 
The district court's decision essentially writes the bond's definition of an "Employee" out 
of the policy, as the court awarded Greenwald Neurosurgical $100,000.00 for money allegedly 
taken from it by Udy in the course of acting on behalf of non-covered entities, while incidentally 
employed by Greenwald Neurosurgical. 
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While Greenwald Neurosurgical's response is simply that Udy worked for Greenwald 
Neurosurgical and, therefore, if he stole from that entity there is coverage, that position ignores 
the bond's definition of an "Employee," which requires that the theft be accomplished in the 
"regular service of the Insured" (a neurosurgical practice) in the "ordinary course" of the 
"Insured's business" (a neurosurgical practice). 
Udy's theft, as alleged by the Ditmore and Clayton affidavits, was not accomplished as 
an "Employee" of Greenwald Neurosurgical, as that term is defined by the bond. Accordingly, 
there is at least a disputed issue of fact as to whether the bond covered the purported loss to 
Greenwald Neurosurgical. 
E. The Court's Decision that Only Greenwald Neurosurgical Was Covered is Correct. 
Greenwald Neurosurgical resurrects its argument that Dr. Greenwald, and all of his 
business entities, are covered for their losses from Udy's theft. See Respondent's Brief, pp. 22-
23. This argument is primarily based on the view that because the bond identifies the insured as 
"Brent H. Greenwald dba Greenwald Neurosurgical,"9 and because an assumed business name is 
simply a name under which another entity does business, Dr. Greenwald, personally, is the 
insured under the bond. See id., p. 22, citing Idaho Code§ 30-21-803. Furthermore, because Dr. 
Greenwald wanted to cover "any and all businesses conducted from my office location" when he 
obtained the bond in 2002, (R., pp. 91-92, <J[ 3), he argues that he and all his businesses are 
9 This is, actually, incorrect, as the bond identifies the insured as "Brent H. Greenwald dba 
Greenwald Neurosurgical 3200 CHANNING WAY, A-106, IDAHO FALLS, ID 83404." (R., p. 
18.) 
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covered because the bond states it is "FOR ANY TYPE OF BUSINESS." Respondent's Brief, p. 
23_10 
The argument fails for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that it is incoherent. 
Greenwald Neurosurgical argues on p. 23 that "daily usage" indicates that the bond covers "all 
businesses" owned by the insured, but then three paragraphs later argues that the district court 
incorrectly ruled that the identity of the named insured on the bond "means anything other than 
Brent H. Greenwald." Which is it? Does the bond cover all entities, and Dr. Greenwald 
personally, or just Dr. ·Greenwald, personally? 
Furthermore, Dr. Greenwald is not a party to this litigation, and neither is Allagash 
Realty. It is axiomatic that a judgment cannot be entered for a person or entity that is not a party 
to the action. Valentine v. Perry, 118 Idaho 653, 655-56, 798 P.2d 935, 937-38 (1990). Hence, 
the argument that either is covered under the bond is inappropriately before this Court. 
At this point, respondent has effectively mooted the issue, as the affidavits of Ditmore 
and Clayton contend that Udy (a) took the $140,095.00 (initially identified as taken from 
Allagash Realty) from Greenwald Neurosurgical, and (b) took the $130,091.20 (initially 
10 What Dr. Greenwald subjectively "intended" back in 2002 is immaterial. Though a court in 
some circumstances is permitted to analyze "what a reasonable person in the position of the 
insured would have understood the language of the contract to mean," see Foremost Ins. Co. v. 
Putzier, 102 Idaho 138, 142 (1981 ), that analysis is simply one rule of construction conducted 
solely to determine the intent of the parties with respect to an ambiguous contract. Id. The rule 
is only applied after a determination of ambiguity by the court, and it is an objective standard. 
Under the doctrine of reasonable expectations, "the controlling test is a purely subjective one as 
to what the insured believed he was purchasing, with the only restraint being that that belief be 
reasonable." Id., n. 5. This is not the test in Idaho. Accordingly, Dr. Greenwald's subjective 
beliefs are immaterial. 
17 
identified as taken from Dr. Greenwald personally) as also being taken from Greenwald 
Neurosurgical. 
It is difficult to understand how Greenwald Neurosurgical can argue that the losses are to 
it in this appeal, but at the same time urge upon the court an interpretation of the bond that would 
permit it to argue - in the event of a remand - that there is coverage for losses to Dr. Greenwald, 
personally, Allagash Realty, LLC, and Greenwald Neurosurgical. 
Those considerations aside, the district court appropriately decided that only Greenwald 
Neurosurgical can be covered by the bond. 
The district court decided that the bond could only cover one entity, the neurosurgical 
practice, because the bond only covers losses caused by an "employee" paid a "wage" or 
"salary" by the named insured. (R., p. 285 and 287.) It was undisputed that only Greenwald 
Neurosurgical paid Udy a wage or salary. (R., p. 285.) Accordingly, only its losses could be 
covered. 
Just because Dr. Greenwald had Mr. Udy do things for himself and Allagash Realty 11 did 
not make Mr. Udy an "employee" of either under the bond. 
The policy defines an "employee" as follows: 
SECTION 4. The word Employee or Employees, as used in this bond, shall be 
deemed to mean, respectively, one or more of the natural persons (except 
directors or trustees of the Insured, if a corporation, who are not also officers or 
employees thereof in some other capacity) while in the regular service of the 
11 As Dr. Greenwald noted in his affidavit, he has employees at his 3155 Channing Way, Suite B 
address who "provide services relating to not only the neurosurgery practice, but also 
bookkeeping and accounting with regard to my personal investments." (R., p. 91, <JI 1.) 
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Insured in the ordinary course of the Insured' s business during the term of this 
bond, and whom the Insured compensates by salary. or wages and has the right to 
govern and direct in the performance of such service, and who are engaged in 
such service within any of the States of the United States of America, or within 
the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, or elsewhere for a 
limited period, but not to mean brokers, factors, commission merchants, 
consignees, contractors, or other agents or representatives of the same general 
character. (Emphasis added.) 
It was undisputed below that Greenwald Neurosurgery, P.C., paid Mr. Udy, which is 
undisputed on this appeal, and there was no evidence below that either Dr. Greenwald or 
Allagash Realty compensated Udy with wages or salary. This is shown by Mr. Udy's W4 and 
W2, 12 and an affidavit by Dr. Greenwald in which he stated that Mr. Udy worked for his 
"practice." (R., pp. 58-59. 13) 
Because Mr. Udy does not meet the bond's definition of employee with respect to 
Allagash Realty, LLC, or Dr. Greenwald personally, there can be no coverage for either. There 
is only coverage for losses caused by an employee, who is paid a wage or salary by the named 
insured, for loss to the named insured. 
The district court correctly decided this issue. (R., p. 287 (Udy only an employee of the 
"P.C." and therefore there could only be coverage for losses to it.) 
Furthermore, Greenwald Neurosurgical does not seem to understand that, if it is correct, 
then Dr. Greenwald is the sole insured, and judgment in Western Surety's favor is appropriate 
12 The W-4 (R., p. 58) at the bottom identifies "Greenwald Neurological" as Mr. Udy' s employer, 
while the W-2 (R., p. 59) identifies Greenwald Neurosurgical Corp. as Mr. Udy's employer. 
13 The Affidavit of Brent H. Greenwald (dated January 15, 2014) provides that Dr. Greenwald's 
neurosurgery "practice" is located at 3155 Channing Way, Suite B, Idaho Falls, and that he 
employed several people "in [his] practice," including "Matt Udy." (R., p. 53, <J[<J[ 1 and 2.) 
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because it is undisputed that only Greenwald Neurosurgical paid Udy, and Udy does not qualify 
as an "employee" of Dr. Greenwald (personally) because Dr. Greenwald (personally) did not pay 
him. 
There are other problems with Greenwald Neurosurgical's argument. 
First, there is no such entity as "Brent H. Greenwald dba Greenwald Neurosurgical." It 
was not registered with the Idaho Secretary of State before the litigation, during it, or to date. 
(The court should note that Western Surety never made an issue of this and stipulated, on the 
record, that it considered Greenwald Neurosurgical to be the insured.) 14 It is meritless to argue 
that the bond can cover a dba that has never existed. 15 
Second, this Court should understand that initially Greenwald Neurosurgical succeeded 
in convincing the district court that the named insured in the bond was "ambiguous" because the 
named insured was not registered with the Idaho Secretary of State. Once it created an ambiguity 
the plan, apparently, was to argue for coverage based on Dr. Greenwald's intentions when the 
bond was obtained in 2002. Dr. Greenwald argued that he intended to bond himself, personally, 
and "all my professional and business activities," (R., p. 92, 'I[ 4), and "any type of business 
conducted under the roof of my office at 3155 Channing Way, Idaho Falls." (R., p. 93, 'I[ 8.) 
14 Counsel noted at the January 13, 2017 hearing on Western Surety's motion for summary 
judgment that the company never used the fact that the dba wasn't registered as a coverage 
defense and that it considered Greenwald Neurosurgical to be the insured. 
15 Idaho Code § 30-21-810 provides that anyone transacting business in Idaho under an assumed 
business name without having complied with the requirements of this chapter shall not be 
entitled to maintain a legal action until it has filed a certificate. Western Surety has never raised 
the statute as a defense but recognizes that at this stage of the litigation this Court may determine 
that the issue is germane. 
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It is not possible to interpret the named insured on the bond as applying to any entity 
other than Greenwald Neurosurgical. 
Rules of contract interpretation require analysis of the policy language alone. See Farm 
Bureau Ins. Co. of Idaho v. Kinsey, 149 Idaho 415, 419 (2010) (a provision in an insurance 
policy is ambiguous if it is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations). See also Brown v. 
Green/wart, 157 Idaho 156, 166 (2014) (holding that when a document is ambiguous then 
evidence as to the meaning of the instrument may be submitted to the finder of fact); Lakeland 
True Value Hardware, LLC v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 153 Idaho 716,723,291 P.3d 399,406 
(2012) (" [t]he purpose of interpreting a contract is to determine the intent of the contracting 
parties at the time the contract was entered. In determining the intent of the parties, this Court 
must view the contract as a whole .... Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law"). 
The identified insured ("Brent H. Greenwald dba Greenwald Neurosurgical 3200 
CHANNING WAY, A- 106, IDAHO FALLS, ID 83404") is not "reasonably subject to 
conflicting interpretations." Fann Bureau, 149 Idaho at 419. The 3200 Channing Way address 
was Greenwald Neurosurgical's address when the bond was applied for and purchased, as the 
bond notes and as the 2001 articles of incorporation provide. (R., p. 49.) There was no evidence 
this was Dr. Greenwald's personal address. Furthermore, Allagash Realty, LLC, did not exist 
until 2009. It is not possible to interpret a bond that identifies a single entity, at a single address, 
to have the "reasonable conflicting meaning" of insuring the doctor personally and any business 
owned by him at any time from 2002 forward. 
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Applying basic rules of contract construction, the only "reasonable" interpretation is that 
the neurosurgical practice is "the Insured." 
It is not grammatically possible to give the entity identified in the bond more than one 
meaning, or the expansive meaning urged by Greenwald Neurosurgical, i.e., that the bond 
covered any business owned by Dr. Greenwald from 2002 onward. Whether or not the entity 
exists, there is only one entity identified (a neurological practice), and expanding it to include 
two or more entities (one of which is an individual) would require the conjunction "and" and/or 
"or" on the line, or a comma between entities/individuals, or some other indication in the 
language itself that it means more than one entity and/or individual. Because taking this 
approach would "create a liability not assumed by the insurer," i.e., the insuring of multiple 
businesses and/or individuals, the Court should not interpret the bond as potentially insuring 
more than one insured. 
Supporting this analysis is that the bond' s indemnification language uses the singular 
term "the Insured," and uses the singular term "Insured" throughout. There is no reference to 
"Insureds," or any indication that the bond contemplates insuring multiple entities. 
Further supporting this analysis is that the bond plainly provides that it is for a 
"business." It does not cover individuals. It is therefore not a "reasonable interpretation" of the 
insured identified in the bond to include Dr. Greenwald personally, because it is a bond that 
protects a business. 
In conclusion, there is no way to "reasonably" interpret the inclusion of a single, non-
existent named insured on the policy into two business entities (one of which, Allagash Realty 
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LLC, did not even exist in 2002, being formed in 2009) and an individual, for a total of three 
named insureds. 
Nor is it reasonable to reach the extreme interpretation urged by Plaintiff in paragraphs 4 
and 8 of Dr. Greenwald's Affidavit, i.e., that the bond covered any business owned by Dr. 
Greenwald at any time at his neurosurgical practice's address. (R., pp. 92-93, <J[ 3.) 
Last, Greenwald Neurosurgical's effort to argue that the bond covered all of Dr. 
Greenwald's businesses because it states, at the top, that it is a "DISHONESTY BOND (FOR 
ANY TYPE OF BUSINESS)," is misplaced. The district court rejected the argument, finding 
that it could not be utilized to expand the "otherwise specific identity of the insured ... " (R., p. 
286.) Even were one to assume that the language is part of the insuring language, it does not 
change the outcome here, as the language merely indicates that the bond is not limited to a 
specific type of business. It applies to "any type," i.e., neurosurgical practice, real estate office, 
etc. It certainly cannot be "reasonably" construed to mean that it applies to "any" business of 
"any type" owned by the insured, including businesses not identified as a named insured. 
F. Assuming this Court Upholds the Judgment, the District Court's Attorney Fee 
Adjustment was Appropriate. 
The district court's refusal to award Greenwald Neurosurgical its full amount of attorney 
fees under Idaho Code § 41-1839 was warranted, as the court exercised its discretion under Rule 
54 and refused to award Greenwald Neurosurgical fees for litigating the claims of non-parties, 
i.e., Dr. Greenwald personally and Allagash Realty, LLC. (R., pp. 759-760.) "Much of the 
attorney fees incurred prior to this Court's Decision of January 13, 2017 were incurred in 
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promoting the claims of these non-parties. Those attorney fees are not recoverable." (R., p. 
760.) 
IRCP 54 (d)(l)(B) provides that the Court may "apportion the costs between and among 
the parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims involved 
in the action and the resulting judgment or judgments obtained." Attorney fees are processed in 
the same manner as costs. See IRCP 54(e)(5). Greenwald Neurosurgical incurred significant 
fees on issues that it either lost on or that had no relationship to the sole issue identified by the 
Court as at issue, which was the loss to the P.C. The district court, correctly, refused to award 
those. 
For the same reasons, the district court correctly refused to award all fees incurred under 
Idaho Code §41-1839, as the statute only permits an award of a "reasonable" amount of fees. 
Last, Western Surety argues there is a basis for this Court to hold that the district court 
should have awarded no attorney fees. This is because Idaho Code § 41-1839 requires 
submission of a valid proof of loss before suit. Here, the district court determined that the pre-
litigation materials submitted to Western Surety did not apportion loss to Greenwald 
Neurosurgical, which it later found to be the only covered entity. It was only when the Ditmore 
and Clayton affidavits were submitted in April, 2017, that the court considered there to have 
been evidence of loss to Greenwald Neurosurgical, long after the complaint was filed. 
This Court should not award attorney fees where a bond claimant ignores its surety's 
requests for information necessary to adjust the claim. While Western Surety still contends that 
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there are disputed issues of fact in the case, the facts of loss to Greenwald Neurosurgical were 
not provided until the Ditmore and Clayton affidavits in April, 2017. 
That is a little late under Idaho Code §41-1839, which requires submission of a valid 
proof of loss in advance of litigation before fees can be awarded. 
II. CONCLUSION 
Greenwald Neurosurgical's contentions, documentary evidence, and legal positions have 
been ever-changing throughout the life of the claim and in the litigation. It refused to apportion 
loss to itself during the claims process, talcing the position that because the bond covered loss to 
Dr. Greenwald personally, his neurosurgical practice, and his real estate company, 
apportionment was unnecessary. Once it lost that battle it submitted the Clayton and Ditmore 
affidavits and claimed that the amounts taken "from Allagash" and incurred on Dr. Greenwald' s 
personal credit cards were actually taken from Greenwald Neurosurgical. And it asks this Court 
to rule that the bond covers all of the above entities, even though the Clayton and Ditmore 
affidavits seems to say that the money was only taken from Greenwald Neurosurgical. And even 
though neither Dr. Greenwald, personally, or Allagash Realty, are parties to the case. 
Greenwald Neurosurgical's case is rife with contradictions. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment. 
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